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The effectiveness of a log export ban policy in achieving the twin goals of conservation 
and economic development has been vigorously debated by many researchers and policy-
makers for the last two decades or so.  Despite the abundance of work focusing on this 
issue that demonstrates the perversity of this policy, many countries around the world 
still implement it.  This paper will, first, review the economic and political arguments on 
the pros and cons of this policy.  Second, it will review the Indonesian experience in 
implementing the policy in the 1980s and 2000s.  Third, using a CGE model, this paper 
will predict the anticipated impact of implementing the log export ban policy on the 
national economy and on household incomes for various socio-economic groups. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Log export ban (LEB) policy aiming to conserve forest covers and to induce local 
economic development has been conducted by forest rich countries/regions for a long 
time.  Restrictions on log exports from British Columbia-Canada and from Alaska-United 
States (US) during the early 1900s were probably the first two cases of an LEB policy 
implementation (Lane, 1998).  Since then, more countries have followed suit, despite the 
existence of opinions questioning the effectiveness this policy.  In the last two decades, a 
significant number of forest rich countries, particularly developing countries, have 
implemented an LEB policy (Table 1).  At the same time, the debate as to the 
effectiveness of such a policy in achieving the twin goals of conservation and economic 
development has intensified (Goodland and Daly, 1996; Kishor et al., 2004).   
 
In general the debate is as follows:  On one hand, forest managers believe that 
imposing an LEB policy will encourage the development of local forest-based 
industrialisation with a strong export orientation.  The development of local forest-based 
industry is expected to create greater value-added as well as more job opportunities in the 
country (Ehinger, 1992; Vincent, 1992; Azis, 1992).  Furthermore, forest managers 
expect that a country currently exporting large amounts of primary products will increase 
its exports of forest-based industrial products and thus also its export revenues (Azis, 
1992).  In the same camp, conservationists believe that an LEB policy is a second best 
policy to reduce the amount of timber exploitation, since log exports decline, thus 
reducing the rate of deforestation.  And more recently, both forest managers and 
conservationists see the LEB as a measure that is relatively easy to enact in combating 
illegal logging, since most such logs are exported. 
 Table 1. Indicative list of Countries Implementing Log Export Restrictions 
 










1990 to present    Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief 
Act (1990): 100% export ban on logs from Federal 
lands west of the 100 th meridian, except timber 
surplus to needs, and 1995 ban on log exports from 
State and other public lands (excluding Indian land) 
west of the 100th meridian. 
Canada
3  1906 to present  6.32%  Restriction on log exports from British Columbia, 
Variety of Federal and Provincial regulations 
regarding the export of logs. 
Bolivia
4  1974 – 1996   1.42%  Log export bans 
Brazil
5  1969 to present  14.06%  Log export bans 
Cameroon
6 June  1999  to 
present 
0.62%  Log export restrictions in the form of a progressive 
increase in the share of annual cutting going to local 
processing 
Costa Rica
7  May 1986 to 
present 
0.05% Log  export  bans 
Ghana
8 1972,  extended 
in 1979 and 1994  
to present 
0.16%  Log export bans. A ban on all exports of raw logs 
has been decreed, beginning in 1994.  
1980 – 1992  2.71%  Log export bans 





to mid 2002. 




1994 to present  0.79%  Log export bans quota, now replaced by export 
duties. 
1992 to present  0.50%  Quota on export of log for Serawak.  Malaysia
11 
1993-1996    Log export bans, from Sabah. 
New Zealand
12  1993 to present  0.21%  1993 Forest Amendment Act bans export of most 
logs, chips, and sawn timber from natural forest and 
restricts harvest to areas with an approved 
sustainable management plan. 
1989 to present  0.15%  Export bans on all native wood products with the 




January 1999 to 
present 
  Logging is banned on slopes of 50% gradient and 




1999 to present  22%  Licensing and export tax for beech, oak and ash. 
1992 to present  0.25%  Ban on export of logs and sawn timber for wood 
harvested from natural forests. 
Vietnam
15 
April, 1992 to 
present 
  Prohibition of commercial logging in the remaining 
natural forests in Northern Vietnam, south-east of the 
South Mekong Delta, and in the Red River Delta. 
Cambodia
16 September,  1992 
to present 
0.24%  Cambodia's provisional national council 
agreed  to a moratorium on log exports 
Thailand
17  1989 to present  0.38%  A complete logging ban imposed by the cabinet 
China
18  1998 to present  4.22%  Logging bans 
Note: 1 In the year 2000  
2 Lane (1998), APEC (2000), Kishor et al (2004). 
3 Lane (1998), APEC (2000), Kishor et al (2004). 
4 International Institute for Environment and Development, May 1999, Privatising Sustainable Forestry, A 
Global Review of Trends and Challenges (http://www.iied.org ), Kishor et al (2004). 
5 Kishor et al (2004), TED database (http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/brazil.htm)  
6 Kishor et al (2004), August 2003 Edition of hardwoodmarkets.com (http://www.hardwoodmarkets.com) 
“Africe-Cameron-75% reduction in log exports”. 
7 Kishor et al (2004). 
8 TED database of case study, (http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/ghana.htm), Kishor et al 
(2004) 
9 APEC (2000), Kishor (2004),  
10 FAO (2000), “Asia and the Pacific National Forestry Programmes: Update 34” (http://www.fao.org)  
11 APEC (2000), TED database of case study (http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/malay.htm) 
12 APEC (2000)  
13 APEC (2000), “Philippines: Row Rages Over Lifting of Log Export Ban” article in 
http://www.forest.org, FAO (1997), Asia-Pacific Forestry Sector Outlook Study: Commentary on Forest 
Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region. http://www.fao.org  
14 APEC (2000) 
15 FAO (2000), “Asia and the Pacific National Forestry Programmes: Update 34” (http://www.fao.org), 
“Cambodia’s Future on the Move: A Briefing Document by Global Witness”, March 1998 
(http://www.globalwithness.org ).  
16 TED database (http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/TED/camwood.htm) 
17 TED database (http://www.american.edu/TED/thailog.htm)  
18 CIFOR news online No. 35, May 2004 (http://www.cifor.cgiar.org)  
 
 
On the other hand, plenty of work focuses on this issue, demonstrating the 
perversity of LEBs, although agreeing that this policy induces the development of local 
forest-based industry.  A significant number of these works show that removing it will 
increase a country’s revenue from forest related industries (Wisemann and Sedjo, 1981; 
Gillis, 1988; Perez-Garcia et al., 1994; APEC, 2000; Kishor et al., 2004).  Some 
specifically argue that an LEB reduces a country’s export revenue from forest and wood 
products (Lindsay, 1989; Manurung and Buongiorno, 1997).  Some doubt that an LEB 
can reduce the rate of deforestation and even believe that it could discourage the adoption 
of sustainable practice in timber harvesting (Deacon, 1995; Dean, 1995; Barbier et al., 
1995 check). Although LEBs might increase job opportunities, the number of new jobs is 
not that significant compared to the loss of revenue from forest related industries (Perez-
Garcia, 1997) and these new job opportunities diminish as the severity of environmental 
problems increases (Dean and Gangopadhyay, 1997). 
 
Recently in Indonesia, the debate on the LEB again became heated among policy 
makers and individuals interested in the forestry sector.  In October 2001, the Ministry of 
Forestry and Ministry of Trade and Industry enacted a new regulation to ban exporting 
any logs from Indonesia, making this the second time Indonesia had adopted an LEB 
policy.  The main objectives for its adoption this time are, first, to combat the illegal 
export of logs and, second, to boost the development of forest-based manufacturing 
industries.  This policy was supported by various NGOs who are concerned that the 
current rate of deforestation is too high and maintain that one of the main causes for this 
is the illegal export of logs (EIA and Telapak, 2002).  The policy was also supported by 
business people in the wood processing manufacturing industries, particularly people in the plywood industry, who face strong competition from China in the world market.  
They believe significant inputs for the wood processing manufacturing industries in 
China come from Indonesia (Gellert, 2005; Obidzinski, 2005).  An LEB will then force 
Chinese industries to obtain logs elsewhere, most likely at a higher price, thereby 
increasing their production cost.  Meanwhile an LEB is expected to reduce the domestic 
price of logs, so making the wood processing industries in Indonesia more competitive. 
 
Last year a new cabinet was formed.  The new Minister of Trade, supported by 
the head of the Indonesian National Planning Agency (Bappenas) and various 
academicians, plans to eliminate the LEB.  The main argument is that it will create a 
distortion in the economy, so reducing the country’s welfare. Debates over the pros and 
cons of the LEB policy then took place in several forestry forums.  The objective of this 
paper is therefore as follows:  First, to review the economic and political arguments as to 
the pros and cons of this policy;  Second, to review the Indonesian experience in 
implementing the policy in the 1980s and 2000s; Third, using a CGE model, to predict 
the anticipated impact of implementing the LEB policy on the national economy and on 
household incomes for various socio-economic groups.  It is hoped that this paper will be 
useful as a comparative case for countries in addition to Indonesia currently 
implementing an LEB policy. 
 
The organisation of this paper is as follows.  Following this introduction is a 
section revisiting the pros and cons of the LEB policy; including some discussions on the 
empirical works related to the debates.  The next section reviews Indonesia’s forestry 
sector.  Then the paper moves on to a section explaining the computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model utilised in this paper, followed by a section describing the 
simulation scenarios that try to capture the possible impact on the Indonesian economy of 
implementing the LEB policy.  Finally there is the conclusion.  
 
 
2.  Revisiting the Debate over the Log Export Ban Policy 
The rationale and arguments in favour of and against the log export ban (LEB) policy 
have been widely discussed in the literature.  The debate has encompassed many diverse 
issues which can be divided into resource-based industrialisation, employment 
generation, environmental consideration, balance of payment and fiscal implication. This 
section revisits these debates, which also aims to demonstrate the need to implement a 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to analyse them. 
 
2.1. Resource-based industrialisation 
The proponent of the resource-based, downstream industrial development argument 
anticipates that forcing loggers to sell logs only to domestic processing mills would 
induce a strong development of downstream industry.  Furthermore, they believe that by 
advancing export-oriented, natural resource-processing downstream industries, countries 
that are currently exporting primary products could increase their value–added (Kishor, 
2004). 
 This rationale is one of the most widely used to justify the log export restriction.  
It can be traced backed to the old strategy of industrialisations to foster higher economic 
growth.  This strategy is usually associated with the old style of import substituting 
industrial development, protecting domestic industry through trade policies.  Some of the 
LEB regulations even explicitly stated this rationale (Zhang, 1996).  
 
Since the LEB regulation aims to prevent roundwood (log) from directly leaving 
the country, the domestic processing Industry would not have to compete with foreign 
processors for access to the local timber supply, which is typically cheap in the case of 
developing countries (Bran, 2002).  The low cost of logs as a raw material for processing 
industries will expand their scale.  Further expansion is also believed to come from new 
investment in the processing industry.   
 
Figure 1 represents the equilibrium of supply and demand in a country’s logging 
(left) and wood processing (right) sectors.  P0 is the world price of logs; so Q0 is the total 
amount of logs produced by this country and Q
D
0 is the part that is sold to domestic 
processing mills.  Meanwhile, the equilibrium of supply and demand in the wood 
processing industry, associated with the P
Q
0 price of logs is Q
Q
0.  When an LEB is 
imposed, the price of logs drops to P1; processing mills hence are willing to buy as much 
as Q
D
1 which is greater than Q
D
0 but smaller than Q0.  It can be seen that the LEB policy 
creates a welfare loss for the country by as much as the A triangle.  Meanwhile in the 
processing industry, this cheaper price of logs and new investment will shift the supply 
curve to the right, inducing a welfare gain by as much as the areas of B, C and D.  The 
proponent of LEB argues that the welfare gain in the wood processing industry will be 
larger than the welfare loss in the logging industry.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Supply and Demand of Logging and Wood processing Sectors 
 
 
Another related and relevant rationale in favour of the LEB is the efficiency 
argument.  The lower price of logs as a raw material will expand the size of the industry; 
and production will move to its minimum efficient scale (Kishor, 2004).  Meanwhile, the 




























C  PQ0marginal productivity of employment, efficiency will improve in the wood processing 
industry (Lindsay, 1989).  
 
It remains questionable, however, whether or not the shifting of the supply curve 
in the wood processing industry will significantly occur, offsetting the dead weight loss 
in the logging sector.  Most empirical studies, however, do not support such argument.  In 
the case of the Indonesian LEB during the 1980s, Gillis (1988) predicted that the 
domestic value added at world prices in the sawnwood industry was in fact minus $15 per 
every $100 of log inputs, since the sawnwood industry became inefficient in utilising the 
logs.  Boscolo and Vincent (2000) also found a similar result when analysing the 
implementation of the LEB policy in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia.  They 
found that, although processing capacity did occur, it was in fact established at high 
economic cost in the form of subsidisation and inefficiency.  For every cubic meter of 
plywood produced, for instance, 15 to 20 per cent more trees had to be cut than would 
have been the case had the logs been processed by other efficient milling plants in Asian 
countries. Other cases of less efficient and wasteful processing caused by LEBs are cited 
in the works by Barbier et al. (1995) and by Dauvergne (1994).  
 
2.2. Employment generation 
The employment generation argument is another very widely-used rationale for log 
export bans. It claims that more people can be employed in processing industries than in 
logging activities. Export of unprocessed logs may represent the export of employment 
which otherwise could have occurred in the domestic processing sector.  A fall in log 
prices, accompanied by an increase in value added will increase the demand for labour 
and the creation of more employment in the manufacturing forestry sectors (Zhang, 1996, 
Barbier et al, 1995).  This rationale is, again, explicitly mentioned in most government 
regulations implementing log-export restriction.  Preserving employment in the domestic 
wood processing industry had been commonly stated as the rationale for this type of 
regulation (Johnson et al, 1995, Lindsay, 1989).  
 
As many believe that small-scale industry is relatively labour-intensive, the idea 
of promoting small-scale industry has also been mentioned by LEB proponents. This 
argument was explicitly stated in the US Set Aside Act 1958, that the objective of the log 
export ban was to enable small timber companies in local communities to be competitive 
with large timber firms (Lane, 1998).  In line with this argument, Zhang (1996) also 
mentioned that some argued that income distribution could be improved as employment 
in the processing industry would increase and absorb the unemployed and those workers 
from lower paying jobs. 
 
Again, it seems that empirical evidence does not really support the idea that 
employment in the economy will expand as a result of export-log ban policy. This is 
simply because the downsizing of the logging sector will also bring about the contraction 
of employment.  As employment in the processing sector increases, so does 
unemployment in logging activities (Zhang, 1996).  In fact, the experience of log-export 
ban policy in various countries suggests that the expansion of the processing industry 
employs fewer people, which in the end undermines this argument (Zhang, 1996).  
2.3. Environmental considerations 
Concerns, particularly for the high rate of deforestation in developing countries, 
increasingly became one of the most recent and important rationales for the LEB policy.  
Environmentalists argue that the market price and quantity of logs does not take into 
account the fact that the market supply only represents the private marginal cost of 
logging, excluding its externalities.  Externalities associated with deforestation include 
the ignorance of the use of non-timber forest benefits such as water-shed protection, as 
well as carbon and biodiversity storage. The inclusion of true marginal social cost should 
shift the log supply curve to S
L
1 as illustrated in Figure 2, and the socially optimum 
extraction of logs should be C instead of B, given P1 as the world price of log.  Ignoring 
what would be the market price of logs, this can be achieved, in the case of Figure 2, by 
eliminating the entire log export.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Illustration of the Environmental Concern Argument 
 
 
Following the reduction in timber exports, deforestation in general is expected to 
decrease.  This idea has recently been formally stated in many LEB regulations i.e. to 
preserve the existing resource from over-harvesting and improving national forests for 
future generations (Lane, 1998).  It has been viewed as a second best policy tool for 
addressing environmental externalities.  Despite not being the first best solution, the LEB 
is considered easy to implement (Kishor, 2004).  Nowadays, in various countries, LEBs 
have become traditionally associated with protecting forests from overuse (Bran, 2002).  
 
The environmental argument for the log-export ban seems to be strengthened 
when linked to the prevalence of illegal logging in various developing countries.  In those 
countries, there is a strong belief that most of the illegal log-harvesting is merely in 
response to increasing log demand by processing mills abroad which are willing to pay 
higher than domestic prices.  The magnitude of illegal logging is expected to decrease, 
following the implementation of the LEB, because lower domestic prices eliminate the 
incentive to conduct such a risky operation.   
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B Despite increasing support from environmentalists, the counter-argument against 
LEB policy from an environmental perspective is also strong. The theoretical literature 
on trade and the environment (summarized by Kishor, 2004) does not support the view 
that LEBs can be used as a second-best policy tool for externality.  Less efficient 
domestic wood processing industries will use many more logs compared to a similar 
more efficient industry abroad, hence inducing a much higher rate of deforestation.  
Pearson (2000) further argued that the first best method for dealing with deforestation is 
with domestic rather than trade measures.  Export restriction can create a distortion 
involving additional costs.  Instead of using trade restriction, production or consumption 
intervention and creation of markets and proper assignment of property rights would be a 
better approach for dealing with deforestation and environmental problems in general.  
 
Several empirical works also found that the implementation of LEB policy in 
various countries in fact was not associated with slower deforestation.  Kishor (2004) and 
Dauvergne (1994), for example, argued that the lower log price following the export ban 
policy may have encouraged substitution of wood for primary inputs (capital and labour), 
hence increasing demand for timbers and creating more pressure on forests.  Moreover, a 
lower price for timber may create disincentives for forest conservation.  Loggers may 
become more ignorant as to the negative environmental impacts of their activity since 
they do not see financial gain from conserving forests.  As Barbier et al (1995) argued, by 
depressing timber prices, log-export bans have discouraged the adoption of sustainable 
practices in timber harvesting and have reduced incentives to adopt more modern 
technology geared toward increasing wood recovery rations in timber processing.  Lower 
log prices have reduced relative returns to forestry sectors and have intensified the 
pressure to clear forested land for competing agricultural crops and plantations. In the 
case of Indonesia, for example, as Bran (2002) emphasised, the development of the 
timber processing industry intensified the pressure on Indonesia’s forest resources, and 
aggravated the already significant rate of deforestation.  
 
2.4. Balance of payment implication 
The balance of payment implication of LEB policy mainly involves its impact on trade 
issues i.e. export, fair trade, and foreign exchange earnings.  Governments in some 
developing countries believe that outward orientation of high value-added industries is 
the best strategy for economic development.  This, in addition to other factors, was 
inspired by the success of the newly industrialised countries such as Korea and Taiwan, 
where economic openness and their export-oriented machinery and electronic — having a 
higher value added than primary industries — industrialisation had been proven to be 
effective in fostering higher economic growth.  Thus the LEB is believed to be a good 
policy to increase the value of exports, since processed-wood products may have a higher 
value added than primary products.  It is expected that the country will accumulate more 
foreign exchange earnings, a very important resource to finance the import of investment 
goods for domestic capital accumulation, a necessary element of economic growth
1. 
 
                                                 
1 See Fujita and James (1997) for a discussion of export orientation and its relationship to the export of 
primary products in the case of Indonesia. Related to trade issues in general, Kishor (2004) mentioned the idea that LEB 
policy could have been simply a counter-measure on the part of developing countries 
who believed that their domestic processing industry was discriminated against in the 
developed country market for various reasons, of which a recent one is the requirement of 
eco-labelling.  LEB policy, then, had been considered as an attempt to protect the 
domestic processing industry from this “unfair trade”, decreasing their cost of production 
and making them look much more competitive in the world market.  
 
On the other hand, developed countries, following the export ban of developing 
countries, will again make a long-run counter measure, since after a while, trading 
partners will adapt to the policy, making it ineffective.  Log importers, such as Japan, for 
example, may substitute tropical woods for other raw materials, or find an alternative 
supply such as logs from temperate and other regions.  This has made the LEB policy 
difficult to sustain in the long-run. 
 
2.5. Fiscal implication 
Besides higher foreign-exchange earnings, the other rationale for the log export ban 
policy is related to government budget.  It is expected that export of higher value added 
products in the form of processed woods would generate more revenue for the 
government budget from higher export tax earnings (Lane, 1998, Kishor, 2004).   
 
The idea that the LEB may prevent the evasion of tax on logging activities which 
is prevalent in many developing countries also has a fiscal implication.  The Indonesian 
government, for example, put forward this rationale when implementing the policy in 
1980s.  Timber extraction enterprises were suspected of evading tax from their high 
export earnings, and the diversion of tax objects from the extraction to the processing 




3.  Forestry Sector in Indonesia 
Approximately 10 per cent of the world’s tropical forests or around 144 million ha are 
located in Indonesia, scattered from the westernmost tip of Sumatra to the eastern border 
of Papua, occupying approximately 70 per cent of the country’s land area (Barbier, 
1998).  Therefore Indonesia ranks third — after Brazil and Zaire — in its endowment of 
tropical forests (Forest Watch Indonesia, 2002).  Indonesia’s forests have been one of its 
most important natural assets.  Forestry related activities have provided an important 
source of formal as well as informal employment for many people and have generated 
large amounts of both government revenue and foreign exchange (Indonesia-UK Tropical 
Forest Management Program, 2001).   
 
3.1.  Forest Exploitation and Deforestation 
Forest exploitation has long been conducted in Indonesia.  However, the rate of 
exploitation significantly increased when Soeharto resumed leadership of the country in 
1966–67.  The president was quick to realise the potential of the country’s abundant 
forests.  In the first year of his presidency, he enacted the Law No. 5/1967 on forestry, which put all forests under state control.  This law provided a legitimisation for Soeharto 
to start giving forest concessions (HPH) to various individuals or agencies — many of 
whom were military officers and institutions supporting his regime,
2 who then invited 
foreign partners to join them in exploiting the forests.  By 1971, around 80 forest 
concession permits, mostly in Kalimantan and Sumatra, had been given to various 
individuals and institutions (Barr, 1998).  The number of forest concessions, and 
therefore their area, kept increasing.  As a result, by the mid 1990s more than 500 forest 
concessions had been allocated, covering around 54 million ha of the country’s forest 
area (Forest Watch Indonesia, 2001).   
 
Figure 3 shows the production of industrial roundwood (log), plywood, 
sawnwood, and pulpwood (in m
3) since 1961.  It can be seen that log production 
significantly increased from the end of the 1960s until the mid 1990s.  The sawnwood 
industry started to take off around the mid 1970s, while the plywood industry was 
flourishing by the mid 1980s.  The pulpwood industry started to grow later on — around 
the early 1990s — and was able to exceed the production of sawnwood and plywood for 








1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
Roundwood Plywood S awnwood Pulpwood
 
Source: FAOSTAT (http://faostat.fao.org/) 
 




Along with the increase in their production, the contribution of forest-related 
industries to the national economy also became more significant.  By the mid 1990s, it 
has been conservatively estimated that at least 20 million people depended on Indonesia’s 
forests for the bulk of their livelihood (Sunderlin et al., 2000).  The forestry and wood 
processing sectors accounted for around 4 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
The total forestry and wood processing production ranks second — after mining — in 
                                                 
2  Later on, in the 1970s, the government also established state-owned logging enterprises export value, and typically accounts for approximately 10 per cent or around 5.5 billion 
USD (FWI/GWF, 2002).   
 
It is important to note that log production in Figure 1 does not include illegal 
logging.  Note that illegal logging can take various forms, starting with harvesting logs 
without any permit to under-reporting practices by legal logging companies.  This illegal 
activity obviously goes hand in hand with bribery and corruption practices (Telapak 
Indonesia and EIA, 2001).  The practice of illegal logging was predicted to increase from 
the 1970s onwards — a case of banjir kap (Obidzinski, 2005).  It was estimated that, by 
the end of the 1990s, three times the amount of logs were harvested illegally than legally 
(Scotland et al., 1999).  The amount of wood harvested from Indonesian forests is most 
likely much higher than the number in Figure 1. 
 
The direct implication of this significant increase in log harvesting was the 
acceleration of deforestation. It was suspected that annual deforestation increased from 
below 0.3 million ha annually before 1970 to 0.6 million annually in the 1970s (Table 2).  
The number kept increasing up to around 2 and 3.8 million ha annually between 1990 and 
1997 and between 1997 and 2000, respectively; i.e. the rates of deforestation during 
1990–1997 and 1997–2000 were around 1.4 per cent and 2.7 per cent annually.  These 
figures are higher than the global rate of tropical deforestation in the mid 1990s, which 
was approximately 0.7 per cent per year (FAO, 1997).  Hence, there is an argument that 
Indonesia needs to make a significant effort to reduce its rate of deforestation as well as 
to eliminate illegal logging. 
 
 
Table 2.  Estimated Annual Deforestation (in million ha/year) 
 
Sources Period  Deforestation 
Forestry Department  <1970  <0.3  - 
FAO (1990)  1970-1980  0.6  0.4% 
WRI (1999)  1980-1990  0.8  0.6% 
WRI (1999)  1990-1995  1.2  0.9% 
Holmes (2000)  1995-1997  2.0  1.4% 
Purnama (2003)  1997-2000  3.8  2.7% 
 
 
3.2.  Domestic Wood Processing Industry, Export and The First Log Export Ban 
Log exports increased significantly once Soeharto took power (Figure 4).  Most of the 
increases in log production at the end of 1960s were for export purposes.  This is 
understandable.  There were not many wood processing industries; i.e. sawnwood and 
plywood, in the country. 
 
It was only in the early 1970s that domestic sawnwood manufacturing began to 
increase slightly; while the establishment of plywood manufacturing took place in the 
mid 1970s.  In the late 1970s, the Indonesian government was interested in a more rapid 
development of domestic wood processing industries, particularly plywood, believing 
this was the way to receive a higher value-added from the forestry sector.  To push more forest concession holders to invest in the wood processing sectors, the government 
initially imposed high export taxes on logs.  Since this turned out to be only moderately 
effective, in April 1981 the government issued a log export ban (LEB) regulation.  The 
ban was also accompanied by various subsidies and regulations aimed at the construction 
of a domestic plywood industry.  They included a ban on manual logging and a vertical 
integration requirement for processing mills to have forest concessions to supply them.
3  









1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
Roundwood Plywood S awnwood
 
Source: FAOSTAT (http://faostat.fao.org/) 
Note: No export of pulpwood. 
 




LEB and the vertical integration requirement also made a large number of foreign 
forest concession owners that were reluctant to invest in wood processing industries in 
Indonesia sell their ownership to, as well as pushing many military forest concessions 
into a joint venture with, local business groups — mostly owned by Soeharto’s business 
cronies, such as Bob Hasan of Kalimanis, Prajogo Pangestu of Barito Pacific and Burhan 
Uray of Djajanti — who had access to low interest credits from state-owned banks.  As a 
result, ownership of forest concessions was concentrated into several business groups; i.e. 
the 15 largest business groups in this sector owned almost 40 per cent of the total 
concession area (Barr, 1998), and 64 business groups owned almost 100 per cent (Brown, 
1999).  
 
                                                 
3 The other aim of the LEB is to reduce tax evasion concerning logging activities. At that time, logging 
enterprises were suspected of evading tax on their high export earning, and it was argued that the diversion 
of tax objects from the extraction to the processing industry made it possible to lower the degree of the tax 
evasion (Lindsay, 1989). To gain a share in the world plywood market, the government forced all plywood 
companies to join the Indonesian Plywood Producers’ Association (Apkindo) headed by 
Bob Hasan, and provided him with a broad mandate to govern Apkindo as a collective 
marketing agency with an ability to control the amount and price of Indonesian plywood 
exports.  Bob Hasan then adopted predatory pricing strategies.  By the early 1990s 
Indonesia’s share of the world tropical plywood market reached approximately 80 per 
cent (Barr, 1998).  By this time, Apkindo had become the world price-setter in tropical 
plywood and was claimed to set the price higher than it should have been.  At the same 
time, Apkindo introduced various fees to its members, and channelled the collected funds 
to other military officers, Soeharto and his foundations, as well as government officials in 
forestry-related sectors (Dauvergne, 1994; Brown, 1999). 
 
Several works have been devoted to analysing the impact of this LEB on the 
Indonesian economy.  Lindsay (1989), who conducted his observation during the 1981–
1986 period, concluded that revenue increases from exporting more plywood and 
sawnwood were less than the losses in log exports.  Manurung and Buongiorno (1997) 
who conducted an analysis for the 1981–1989 period supported this conclusion.  
Furthermore they also found that more jobs were lost in the logging operation than jobs 
were created in the plywood and sawnwood industries.  However, they also found that 
Indonesia received a higher value added from the forestry sector and fewer logs were cut 
under the LEB regime than without it. 
 
Azis (1992), who also worked on this issue, agreed that during the 1980–1985 
period more jobs were lost in logging operations compared to new jobs created in the 
plywood and sawnwood industries.  However, if one considered a longer period of 
analysis in which the ban also stimulated the establishment of pulp, paper and other wood 
product industries, Iwan argued that the number of new jobs created would be 
overwhelmingly higher than the number of job lost in the logging operations. 
 
In 1992, due to external pressure, Indonesia removed the LEB regulation, but 
replaced it with very high rates of export tax, eliminating the vertical integration 
requirement.  Some tax rates were up to 200 per cent; therefore, log exports remained 
low.  Whether or not the LEB was beneficial for the country remained inconclusive 
among policy-makers in Indonesia. 
 
3.3.  Crisis, Illegal Logging and The Second Log Export Ban 
In the early 1990s, the pulpwood industry was established for several reasons.  First, the 
business group involved in the plywood industry, feeling that Indonesia had achieved a 
dominant role in the world tropical plywood market, were looking to diversify their 
activities.  The thought behind choosing to invest in pulpwood was that this would be a 
stepping stone to establishing paper industries that would fulfil the increasing demand, 
both domestic and worldwide, for these products.
4  Second, the government made vast 
wood supplies available to pulpwood producers at relatively low prices (Barr, 2001).  
Some of the large domestic business groups, including the ones in the plywood industry, 
had their own financial institutions, which were able to access international sources of 
                                                 
4  Note timber business groups also diversified their activities into palm oil production. funding, which were willingly allocated, seeing Indonesia was growing at a rate of over 7 
per cent. 
 
Pulp(wood) and paper production hence increased significantly from the early 
1990s up to 1997.  Since large investment was required to build pulp or paper mills, the 
ownership of pulp and paper production was very concentrated.  Three business groups 
— Sinar Mas, owned by Eka Tjipta Widjaja, Raja Garuda Mas, owned by Sukanto 
Tanoto, and Bob Hasan groups — controlled 90 per cent of the total national pulp 
production; while as for the paper industry, the ten largest paper mills, of which five of 
them were owned by Sinar Mas, were responsible for almost 70 per cent of the total 
paper production (Barr, 2001).   
 
It is important to note that the growing number of both plywood and pulpwood 
companies was creating a crisis in the domestic wood supply; i.e. legal wood production 
from domestic forest concessions was not enough to fulfil the demand of the wood 
processing industries (Brown, 1999).  These wood processing industries had also relied 
significantly on the low price of domestic wood.  To solve this wood supply deficit, the 
government produced a permit (IPK) to allow private logging operators to harvest logs 
from areas that had been slated for conversion for a minimal fee (and no reforestation 
fee).  Meanwhile, plywood and pulpwood companies were also accepting more illegally 
logged wood, including wood harvested in conservation areas and with less than the 
allowable diameter (Obidzinski, 2005).  Both IPK and illegal logging are certainly not 
sustainable sources of wood. 
 
It is also important to note that there was considerable debt in the forest-related 
industry by the mid 1990s, though the exact amount is hard to establish.  But one can 
gauge the size of the debt in this sector from the following partial information.  The total 
investment in pulp and paper industries at that time had been accumulated to around USD 
12 billion (Barr, 2001).  Most of this was certainly in the form of debt.  Also, Barito 
Pacific who controlled the largest production of plywood had accumulated debts as high 
as Rp 3.8 trillion (Brown, 1999).  Given the fact that the supply of wood would not be 
sustained at the current rate of demand, investing in the wood processing industry made it 
a risky investment. 
 
As is widely known, in 1997 the economic crisis hit Indonesia so badly that it 
required help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Before providing the 
necessary support, one of the Fund’s requirements was that Indonesia dismantled 
Apkindo’s export marketing power.  By February 1998, Indonesian plywood producers 
were able to export their panels free from Apkindo’s control.  On the other hand, they did 
not have the power to control the world plywood market anymore and at the same time 
they individually had to face new competitors from China. 
 
The financial crisis placed Indonesia’s forestry industries in great turmoil.  They 
were thrown into a severe liquidity crisis.  Approximately USD 3 billion of outstanding 
loans in the forestry sector had to be under the control of the Indonesian government, through its Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA).
5  More than half of these 
outstanding loans were associated with plywood and sawnwood industries, and around 20 
per cent with logging companies (Barr, 2001).  The financial pressures generated by 
debts, and also the inability of plywood companies to renew their machinery so as to 
compete with more efficient mills abroad, particularly in China, significantly contributed 
to the engagement of logging and wood processing companies in illegal logging 
activities. 
 
During the period of 1997–2002, China’s plywood export doubled annually, and 
reached approximately 520 thousand m
3, almost equalling that of Brazil, the third largest 
exporter of plywood after Indonesia and Malaysia.  In general, China’s wood processing 
production surged.  For secondary processed wood products, since 2002 China has 
become the world’s largest exporter, surpassing Italy (Gellert, 2005).  As a consequence, 
with a domestic ban placed on logging in the Southwest of the country since 1998, China 
also became the world’s leading importer of industrial logs.  Meanwhile in Indonesia, in 
addition to the abolition of Apkindo’s control on log exports, the IMF also required 
Indonesia to reduce export log tax rates.  Thus Indonesia’s log exports have increased 
since 1998, particularly to hungry mills in China.  By 2001, the amount of logs legally 
exported made up 5 per cent of the total of industrial log products.  What is more 
noteworthy is that mills in China also received logs from illegal logging in Indonesia.  It 
is suspected that this amount is much larger than that of legally exported logs (EIA and 
Telapak, 2002). 
 
Illegal logging is not at all a new phenomenon in Indonesia, for these activities in 
various forms have occurred for many years.  However, since the mid 1990s, illegal 
logging has appeared to be more widespread across the country, more open, and its 
magnitude to have increased.  Illegal loggers have also been more eager to sell their logs 
to foreign buyers, such as China and Malaysia, who are willing to pay more than 
domestic buyers (Telapak Indonesia and EIA, 2002).  However, the amount is still most 
likely smaller than the amount domestically marketed (Obidzinski, 2005).  By the early 
2000s, illegal logging was clearly one of the main issues in the Indonesian forestry sector, 
as the estimated amount reached approximately three times the amount legally harvested, 
pushing the rate of deforestation to almost double that of the early 1990s. 
 
The Indonesian government reacted to this problem by adopting the LEB policy 
in October 2001 through a joint ministerial degree between the Ministry of Forestry No: 
1132/Kpts-II/2001 and the Ministry of Industry and Trade No: 292/MPP/Kep/10/2001, 
and later on through government regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) No.34 of 8 June 
2002.  Besides reducing the amount of illegally harvested wood, the government also 
wants to protect domestic wood processing industries, particularly plywood, from the 
tough competitors in China. 
 
Environmentalists who are concerned about the on-going rate of deforestation 
supported this policy.  For different reasons, domestic wood processing business people 
                                                 
5  IBRA is a government agency temporarily established to restructure the Indonesian banking system, 
which, otherwise, would have collapsed due to the country’s economic crisis. also support the LEB policy.  They hoped the export ban would make illegal loggers sell 
their logs only to them, and now at a lower price.  With these cheap inputs, they expected 
to be able to compete with the more efficient mills abroad and still make a profit.   
 
Last year a new cabinet was formed.  The new Minister of Trade and the head of 
Bappenas argue that the LEB should be eliminated, since it creates a distortion in the 
economy, so reducing the value of timber.  The pros and cons of the LEB policy have 
since been debated in several forestry forums.   
 
 
4.  The Model 
To be able to analyse the impact of an LEB policy in the context of the Indonesian 
economy, taking into account particularly the development of downstream industry, 
employment and environmental concern arguments, a CGE model for Indonesia is 
utilised.  The CGE consists of six equation blocks (Resosudarmo, 1996), as follows: 
•  Production Block: This block represents the structure of production activities and 
producers’ behaviour. 
•  Consumption Block: This block represents the behaviour of households, government, 
and companies. 
•  Export-Import Block: This block models the country’s exports and imports of goods 
and services. 
•  Investment Block: This block simulates decisions to invest as well as the demand for 
goods and services used in the construction of the new capital. 
•  Market Clearing Block: This block contains market clearing conditions for labour, 
goods and services, and foreign exchange. 
•  Intertemporal Block: This block consists of dynamic equations that link future 
economic conditions to economic activities in the current year. 
 
In the production block, a nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
function represents the production technology.  On the upper level of this nested 
production function, output is defined as a CES function of composite intermediate input 
and value added.  On the lower level, intermediate input is a Leontief function of several 
material inputs (see Resosudarmo 2003).  Value added is a function of factor inputs 
expressed in a CES function.  The functions in the production system are as follows: 
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where: 
  i, j  is the index for production sectors 
  f  is the index for factors of production; i.e. agricultural labourers, 
manual-clerical workers, professional personnel, land and capital 
  X  is the sectoral output   IN  is the composite intermediate input 
 VA    is the composite value-added 
  INT  is the intermediate input 
  FD   is the factor inputs. 
 
There are 62 sectors in the production block (Table 3).  The forestry sector 
consists of Wood, Other Forest Products and Hunting.  The forest-based manufacturing 
sector is disaggregated into 11 production sectors; i.e. sectors number 32 – 42 in Table 3). 
 Table 3.  List of Production Sectors in the CGE Model 
 
No. Sectors No. Sectors 
1 Rice  32  Sawnwood  Industry 
2 Bean  33  Plywood  Industry 
3  Corn  34  Wood Product Industry 
4  Tuber  35  Wood Furniture Industry 
5  Fruit and Vegetable  36  Other Wood Industry 
6  Rubber  37  Non-plastic Anyaman Industry 
7  Sugar Cane  38  Textile Leather Industry 
8 Coconut  39  Pulp  Industry 
9  Palm Oil  40  Paper Industry 
10  Tobacco  41  Paper Product Industry 
11  Coffee  42  Printed Matter Industry 
12 Tea  43 Fertilizer  Industry 
13 Clove  44 Pesticide  Industry 
14 Fibrous  45 Chemical  Industry 
15  Other Estate Crop  46  Cement Industry 
16 Other  Crop  47 
Rubber Plastic Product 
Industry 
17  Livestock  48  Basic Metal Industry 
18 Roundwood  49 Oil  Refinery 
19  Other Forest Product  50  Transport Vehicle Industry 
20  Hunting  51  Electricity Gas Water 
21 Fishery  52 Construction 
22  Metal-Ore-Petrol Mining  53  Retail and Inventory 
23 Other  Mining  54 Restaurant 
24  Food Processing Industry  55  Hotel 
25  Oil-Fat Industry  56  Land Transportation 
26  Rice Mill Industry  57  Air and Water Transportation 
27  Flour Industry  58  Bank and Insurance 
28  Sugar Industry  59  Real Estate 
29  Other Food Industry  60  Public Service 
30  Drink Industry  61  Pesticide-Health Services 
31  Cigarette Industry  62  Private Service 
 
 
In the consumption block, ten different types of household groups are 
distinguished as follows: (1) Agricultural Employee (agricultural workers who do not 
own land); (2) Small Farmer (agricultural land owners with land between 0.0 and 0.5 ha); 
(3) Medium Farmer (agricultural land owners with land between 0.5 and 1.0 ha); (4) 
Large Farmer (agricultural land owners with land larger than 1.0 ha); (5) Rural Non-
labour (non-agricultural households, consisting of non-labour force and unclassified 
households in rural areas); (6) Rural Low Income (non-agricultural households, 
consisting of small retail store owners, small entrepreneurs, small personal service 
providers, and clerical and manual workers in rural areas); (7) Rural High Income (non-
agricultural households, consisting of managers, technicians, professionals, military 
officers, teachers, big entrepreneurs, big retail store owners, big personal service 
providers, and skilled clerical workers in rural areas); (8) Urban Non-labour (non-agricultural households, consisting of non-labour force and unclassified households in 
urban areas); (9) Urban Low Income (non-agricultural households, consisting of small 
retail store owners, small entrepreneurs, small personal service providers, and clerical and 
manual workers in urban areas); (10) Urban High (non-agricultural households, 
consisting of managers, technicians, professionals, military officers, teachers, big 
entrepreneurs, big retail store owners, big personal service providers, and skilled clerical 
workers in urban areas) households. 
 
The expenditures of each household group on goods and services are a function of 
prices and income.  Each household group determines its expenditures by maximizing 
utility according to a simplified version of the Linear Expenditure System, subject to the 
group’s budget constraint.  The budget constraint of each household group equals 
household income minus taxes, savings, and net transfers among households.  The 
following equation represents the budget constraint of each household group: 
  h h h h
i
h i i TR S T Y C P − − − ≤ ⋅ ∑ ,  (4) 
where: 
  h  is the index for household groups 
  P   is the price of commodities 
 C   is household consumption of commodities 
  Y  is the income of households 
  T  is income taxes 
  S  is household savings 
  TR  is net household transfers. 
 
In the investment-saving part, this CGE is a saving-driven model; meaning the 
aggregate investment is determined by the sum of private, government, and foreign 
savings.  Household saving rates for all households are fixed shares of household 
incomes.  Foreign saving is exogenously determined.  Government savings is residually 
defined from the government revenue and consumption equation, in which government 
consumption is an exogenous variable. 
 
In the export-import block, a constant elasticity of technology (CET) function is 
used to model the producers’ decision to supply domestic or international markets, while 
a standard Armington model is applied to model a substitution between domestic and 
imported products. 
 
In the market of factor inputs, land and capital are fixed.  The markets for 
agricultural, manual-clerical, and professional labour are assumed to be always in a full-
employment equilibrium.  Nevertheless, for each type of labour, wage differences 
between sectors were fixed exogenously.  Macro closure specifications for this CGE can 
be summarised as follows.  In the foreign exchange market, the central bank is assumed 
to control the amount of foreign reserve, so allowing the exchange rate as the 
equilibrating mechanism.  Note that the balance of payments flows, such as foreign 
borrowing, interest and amortization payments of international loans, and so on, are set 
exogenously.  
 The CGE is then run for multiple years, in which capital and labour supply 
increase each year with the following formulas: 
  () t i i t i t i DK depr K K , , 1 , 1 + − ⋅ = +  (5) 
where: t  is the index for years 
  K  is the capital in each year for each sector 
  depr  is the depreciation rate 
  DK  is the new capital invested in each year for each sector, 
and 
  () rl LB LB t t + ⋅ = + 1 1  (6) 
where: LB  is the total labour supply in each year 
  rl  is the growth rate of labour supply, taking into account the rates of 
mortality and retiring process. 
 
 
5.  Simulation Scenarios and Results 
The simulation scenarios developed to represent various possible situations to unable us 
to understand the likely impact of the LEB policy on the Indonesia economy are as 
follows: 
•  Base Case Scenario:  This scenario aims to simulate the Indonesia economy from 
1993 to 2004 and the expected condition of the economy from 2005 until 2020.  In 
this scenario, the growth rate of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will be 
as shown in Figure 5.  In this scenario, the Indonesian government implements the 
LEB in 2001.  In this year, the total volume of logs exported is still around 5 per cent 
of the total log production.  In 2002, due to the implementation of the LEB, log 
exports started to drop and gradually decreased until there were no wood exports by 
2005
6.  Another important assumption here is that the LEB policy does not induce an 
inefficient behaviour in the wood processing industries, due to high competition in 
these industries.  This scenario is called the Base Case, since results from all other 
scenarios will be compared to the result from this scenario.  It is important to note 
that the period to be examined is from 2002 to 2020. 
•  Scenario 1:  This scenario simulates a situation in which the Indonesian government 
never implement the LEB policy up to 2020.  Comparing the result from this scenario 
with the Base Scenario, one can understand how the Indonesian economy would gain 
or loose from implementing the LEB policy. 
•  Scenario 2:  This simulation represents the on-going belief that implementation of the 
LEB will only mean more red tape, since the government is currently weak and so no 
regulation can be fully implemented.  In this scenario, then, the LEB policy 
implemented in 2001 is assumed to be translated only into an increase in red tape by 
as much as 30 per cent more than the world price of logs.
7  Furthermore, this assumes 
that the rent will go directly to high income urban households as their incomes.  
 
                                                 
6 The assumption of gradual decline, acknowledging the fact that certain exporters have to meet some 
export commitments. 
7  The 30 per cent is based on several observations in Papua and Kalimantan.  Asking higher than this rate 
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Figure 5.  Growth of GDP in the Base Scenario 
 
 
•  Scenario 3:  In this scenario, it is assumed that the Indonesian government does not 
implement the LEB policy.  However, to protect downstream industry, an export tax 
of as much as 50% of the world price of logs is imposed at the end of 2001.
8  Note 
that the main difference between this scenario and Scenario 2 is that, in this scenario, 
the revenue from this export tax goes to the government, while, in Scenario 2, the 
revenue from red tape goes to high income urban households.  
•  Scenario 4:  This scenario tries to simulate a better policy to address environmental 
concerns, particularly the excessively fast rate of deforestation.  In this scenario, the 
government is assumed to impost a higher output tax — as much as 50 per cent — on 
logging companies.  It is expected that the amount of logs harvested would be less 
than under other scenarios. 
•  Scenario 5:  In this scenario, the Indonesian government implemented the LEB policy 
in 2001 and this policy has been able to attract higher new capital investment from 
2006 until 2010 of as much as 5 per cent, 5 per cent, 20 per cent and 20 per cent in 
the plywood, sawnwood, pulp and paper industries, respectively, compared to the 
rates of new investment in these industries under the Base Scenario. 
 
5.1.  Short-run Observation 
In the short-run observation, we observe the condition of the economy at the end of 2002 
under various scenarios.  This situation can be seen in Table 4.  Please note that the result 
from Scenario 5 is not reported, since it will be the same as the result from the Base 
Scenario.   
 
                                                 
8  The choice of 50 per cent in Scenarios 3 and 4 is arbitrary.  Several environmental groups suggest a much 
higher rate to be able to internalise the environmental consequences of harvesting timber.  This paper tries 
to pick a tax rate that is high enough but not totally eliminates exports. Table 4.  Results from the Base and Other Scenarios for the year 2002 
 
 Scenario 
 1  2  3  4 
 
Base 
Case  No LEB  Red Tape  Export Tax  Output Tax 
GDP  (billion  Rp)  424,088 431,083  1.6% 432,028  1.9% 432,508  2.0% 426,527  0.6% 
Value-added (billion Rp)                 
Roundwood  15,909 36,872  131.8 30,710  93.0 23,466  47.5 20,937  31.6 
Sawnwood  973 1,013  4.2 1,026  5.4 1,035  6.3 1,273  30.8 
Plywood  3,169 3,070  -3.1 3,139  -1.0 3,219  1.6 3,701  16.8 
Pulp  283 187  -34.0 197  -30.2 215  -24.1 179  -36.6 
Paper  965 896  -7.1 918  -4.9 945  -2.1 910  -5.7 
Employment  (thousand  people)           
Roundwood  1,779 2,891  62.5% 2,594  45.9% 2,211  24.3% 2,164  21.6% 
Sawnwood  220 238  7.8% 237  7.6% 235  6.7% 283  28.3% 
Plywood  823 839  2.0% 843  2.5% 848  3.0% 970  17.9% 
Pulp  281 217  -23.0% 223  -20.6% 234  -16.7% 211  -25.1% 
Paper  805 794  -1.4% 799  -0.7% 806  0.0% 804  -0.2% 
Household Income (billion Rp)               
Agric.  Employee  13,332 14,114  5.9% 13,932  4.5% 13,706  2.8% 12,801 -4.0% 
Small-scale  Farmer  61,991 69,056 11.4% 67,196  8.4% 64,968  4.8% 60,504 -2.4% 
Med.  scale  Farmer  16,804 18,531 10.3% 18,104  7.7% 17,582  4.6% 16,333 -2.8% 
Large-scale  Farmer  25,607 27,308  6.6% 26,944  5.2% 26,479  3.4% 24,781 -3.2% 
Rural  Low  Income  18,723 18,989  1.4% 18,952  1.2% 18,906  1.0% 17,891 -4.4% 
Rural  Non-labour  4,963 4,971 0.2% 4,952  -0.2% 4,938  -0.5% 4,721  -4.9% 
Rural  High  Income  60,994 62,209  2.0% 61,887  1.5% 61,532  0.9% 58,541 -4.0% 
Urban  Low  Income  31,728 31,400 -1.0% 31,410 -1.0% 31,468 -0.8% 30,071 -5.2% 
Urban  Non-labour  8,577 8,903 3.8% 8,792 2.5% 8,672 1.1% 8,216  -4.2% 
Urban  High-Income  84,796 81,526 -3.9% 85,805  1.2% 89,937  6.1% 80,142 -5.5% 
 
 
Comparing the results from Scenario 1 and from the Base Case Scenario in Table 
4, it can be seen that not implementing the LEB would make the value-added of the 
logging (roundwood) sector higher by more than 100 per cent than the situation under the 
Base Scenario; i.e. the LEB caused the logging sector value-added to be lower by more 
than 100 per cent in the first year of its implementation compared to the situation without 
the LEB.  The main reason is that the LEB made the price of logs only half what it would 
be if the LEB was not implemented.  In terms of volume, the difference was only 10 per 
cent.  Meanwhile, the LEB induced higher value-added in the plywood, pulp and paper 
industries.  In total, however, the LEB ended up making the GDP of the country 1.6 per 
cent lower than it could be in 2002. 
 
On the employment issue, a year’s implementation of the LEB significantly 
reduced the amount of labour in the roundwood sectors and to a lesser degree in the 
sawnwood and plywood sectors.  Although the number of people employed by the pulp 
and paper sectors increased, the number is much lower than the jobs lost in the roundwood, sawnwood and plywood sectors.
9  Proponents of the LEB seem to get it all 
wrong, at least for the short-run observation. 
 
Observing the impact of LEB on household incomes, it can be seen that all rural 
and agricultural households receive a higher income under the no LEB scenario 
compared to their incomes under the LEB scenario; i.e. the Base Case Scenario.  Hence, 
it can be said that the agricultural and rural households have to share the burden of an 
LEB policy in the short-run. 
 
Observing other alternative scenarios, all will in the short run induce a higher 
GDP than the GDP under the LEB scenario (Base Case Scenario).  The three most 
interesting observations are as follows.  First, in the short-run, having a high export tax is 
probably the better policy.  It is able to produce the highest GDP for 2002 and induces 
higher income for almost all household groups.  For those facing lower income, the 
reduction is relatively very small.   
 
Second, allowing the improper implementation of the LEB policy — meaning 
people can still export their logs as long as they are willing to pay a much higher bribe 
(Scenario 2), although creating an unfair situation that may lead to political chaos, in the 
short-run, does not give such a bad result.  It is still able to induce a GDP approximately 
1.9 per cent higher than that in the Base Case Scenario.  The fact that this is lower than 
the export tax scenario (Scenario 3) indicates that the pattern of government spending is 
able to generate a higher GDP than the spending pattern of the average rich household in 
urban areas.  
 
Third, the implementation of a 50 per cent output tax on the roundwood industry 
(previously the tax rate was relatively small due to the IMF requirement) has not been 
able to reduce timber harvesting as much as the LEB policy (Base Case Scenario); i.e. the 
amount of logs harvested under this scenario is still 4 per cent higher than that under the 
Base Case Scenario.  This policy generated lower incomes for all household groups in 
2002 compared to their incomes under the Base Scenario.  Urban households have to 
shoulder most of the burden of this policy. 
 
5.2.  Long-run Observation 
Tables 5 and 6 present the estimated long run impact of various scenarios.  Table 5 shows 
total present values of GDP and household income gains during the 2001–2020 period.  
The present values are calculated using a 5 per cent discount rate.  Table 6 illustrates the 
total present value of value-added gains using a 5 per cent discount rate and the annual 
average job gains and losses during the 2001–2020 period.  Figure 6 portrays the 
percentage differences of logs harvested between the Base Case and other Scenarios. 
 
                                                 
9 Discussion on jobs lost and gained is rather irrelevant in this context, since the CGE assumes a full 
employment condition. Table 5.  Long Term Observation of GDP and Household Incomes 
 
 Scenario 
  Base  Case  1 2 3  4  5 








GDP 410,938  1,173,182  -37,520  7,917  52,703  -103,429  4,718 
   185%  -0.46%  0.10%  0.65%  -1.27%  0.06% 
Household Income            
Agricultural  Employee  13,573  37,356 6,678 5,688 4,429  -15,103  458 
    175% 2.61% 2.23% 1.73% -5.91%  0.18% 
Small-scale  Farmer  65,929  200,985 80,800 63,861 43,825 -61,506  4,487 
    205% 6.35% 5.02% 3.45% -4.84%  0.35% 
Medium-scale  Farmer  17,732  52,164 18,474 15,017 10,801 -17,243  1,128 
    194% 5.47% 4.45% 3.20% -5.11%  0.33% 
Large-scale  Farmer  26,319  69,314 14,531 12,799 10,390 -25,232  1,207 
    163% 3.02% 2.66% 2.16% -5.25%  0.25% 
Rural Low Income  18,288  50,641  -2,591  -1,348  116  -22,369  363 
    177% -0.73% -0.38%  0.03%  -6.33%  0.10% 
Rural  Non-labour  4,791 13,411 -966 -909 -737  -6,034  -20 
    180% -1.03% -0.97% -0.78%  -6.42%  -0.02% 
Rural High Income  59,829  169,759  -5,803  -3,428  -150  -69,483  1,837 
    184% -0.50% -0.29% -0.01%  -5.96%  0.16% 
Urban Low Income  30,285  82,988  -13,827  -11,298  -7,696  -41,294  -64 
    174% -2.34% -1.91% -1.30%  -6.99%  -0.01% 
Urban  Non-labour  8,541  24,844 2,188 1,509  875  -10,622  240 
    191% 1.31% 0.90% 0.52% -6.37%  0.14% 
Urban  High-Income  78,803  211,993 -77,320 -19,397  35,467 -111,566  -476 
    169% -4.99% -1.25%  2.29%  -7.20%  -0.03% 
 Table 6.  Long Term Observation of Industrial Value-Added and Employment 
 
 Scenario 
 Base  Case  1  2  3  4  5 








Value added (billion Rp)           
Roundwood  34,739  78,874 301,079 223,953 135,143  56,860  10,270 
    227% 74.88% 55.70% 33.61% 14.14%  2.55% 
Sawnwood  978 3,094  -478  -79  307 4,490  -1,042 
    316% -2.35% -0.39%  1.51% 22.09%  -5.13% 
Plywood  2,974  8,582 -4,016 -2,547  -897  7,622  -2,833 
    289% -1.15% -0.73% -0.26%  2.18%  -0.81% 
Pulp  159  964 -838 -741 -594  -1,226  243 
    604% -16.18% -14.30% -11.46% -23.67%  4.68% 
Paper  860  2,255 130 146 148 942  -82 
    262% 0.74% 0.83% 0.84% 5.38%  -0.47% 
Employment  (thousand  people)        
Roundwood 2,783  4,152  1,096 831 509 338  42 
    149% 38.6% 29.3% 18.0% 11.9%  1.5% 
Sawnwood 229  541  10 11 12 85  -8 
    236% 2.59% 3.05% 3.20%  23.00%  -2.27% 
Plywood 810  1,791  -6 4  14  210  -27 
    221%  -0.50% 0.34% 1.11%  16.21%  -2.05% 
Pulp 205  698  -75 -66 -53  -117  26 
    340% -15.61% -13.73% -10.94% -24.29%  5.32% 
Paper 750  1,533  -16 -11  -5 -16  -37 
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Figure 6.  Percentage Differences of Logs Harvested Between Base Case and Other 
Scenarios 
 A long-run comparison between Scenario 1 and the Base Case Scenario shows a 
positive total gain of value-added in the roundwood industry under Scenario 1; i.e. not 
implementing the LEB policy would generate higher total value-added from the 
roundwood industry.  Negative total gains, however, occur in the sawnwood, plywood, 
pulp and paper industries.  By 2020, the total of these negative gains will be much higher 
than the positive gain in the roundwood industry.  It hence is not a surprise that the total 
present value of GDP under the Scenario 1 would be less than that under the Base Case 
Scenario.  Observing the amount of logs harvested annually, it can be seen that up until 
2019, Scenario 1 requires more logs to be cut.  After 2019, more logs are required to be 
harvested under the Base Case Scenario, since the wood processing industries have been 
much larger than they are under the Scenario 1.  This result indicates that in the long-run, 
it might be beneficial to implement an LEB policy.  Several conditions still make it 
unfavourable for the implementation of the LEB policy (Base Case), one of which being 
that more jobs are lost in the roundwood sector than are created in the processing sector.  
Some other sectors need to be able to absorb people who lose their jobs in the roundwood 
sector.  Not implementing the LEB also generates higher incomes for agricultural 
households, many of which are among the poorest households in the country. 
 
Observing the impact of other scenarios on the economy and on logs harvested, 
the following more important notes can be made.  First, the introduction of a higher 
output tax in the roundwood industry (Scenario 4), although in the long-run effective in 
reducing the amount of timber harvested (Figure 6), might result in an adverse long-run 
impact, as the net gain in the present value of GDP is 1.27% lower than the Base Case.  
Compared to other scenarios, a tax that applies to wood products regardless of their 
destination of sales (export or domestic) may even create another significant distortion to 
the economy, with both wood supplier and processing industry suffering by loosing their 
potential outputs.  Household incomes across various groups fall, with the highest drop 
occurring among the urban high-income households. 
 
Second, even for a long-run observation, Scenario 3 (relatively high export tax) 
seems to be the preferable option.  It induces the highest total present value GDP gain 
compared to other scenarios and is relatively able to reduce the amount of logs harvested 
compared to the No LEB scenario (Scenario 1).  There are three household groups 
however that experience a lower total present value gain of incomes under this scenario 
compared to their incomes under the Base Case. 
 
Third, in the long-run, there is not much benefit in allowing the practice of bribing 
officials to avoid the LEB policy (Scenario 2).  Tables 5 and 6, as well as Figure 6, show 
that the export tax scenario (Scenario 3) dominates this Scenario 2 in all indicators.  
Finally, let us observe Scenario 5, which assumes higher new investments in wood 
processing industries occurred during the 2006–2010 period due to the implementation of 
the LEB policy.  This policy induces a higher total present value GDP gain compared to 
the gain under the Base Case, but not by much — only 0.06%.  Total present value gains 
of value-added in sawnwood, plywood and paper are lower under this scenario compared 
to the situation under the Base Case Scenario.  Influx of capital in these industries ends 
up lowering the demand of labour and rent to capital.  Furthermore the impact of this scenario on household incomes is not much different than that of the Base Case Scenario.  
Meanwhile, this scenario requires more wood to be cut even in the long run compared to 
the situation in the Base Case Scenario.  This result indicates that expecting a fast and 
large capital accruing to the wood processing industries by implementing the LEB policy 
would probably not be that beneficial for the country’s economy. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
The first part of this paper reviews the on-going debates related to the LEB policy.  The 
debates are centered around — though not limited to — the issues of downstream 
industrial development, job creation and environmental degradation, namely 
deforestation.  Due to the complexity of the debates, this paper indicates the importance 
of conducting an empirical study to analyse this topic and a dynamic CGE model seems 
to be one of the most appropriate ones. 
 
The case of Indonesia is chosen in this paper given the importance of the 
Indonesian forestry sector for the country as well as for international communities.  
Furthermore, at present Indonesia has implemented the LEB policy for the second time.  
This time concerns regarding the high rate of deforestation and the explosion in illegal 
logging are the main reasons.  The debate as to whether or not an LEB policy is 
beneficial for the country is currently heated among policy-makers and others interested 
in the forestry sector.  So far there is no consensus. 
 
Before describing the main finding from a CGE analysis conducted in this paper, 
it is important to understand several weaknesses of the CGE utilised.  First, the latest 
Social Accounting Matrix with details of the wood and wood processing industries 
required for the CGE model in this paper is not available at the moment.  Hence, the data 
set for 1993 is utilised.  Although all efforts have been conducted so that the CGE 
simulation can mimic the Indonesian economy from 1993 to 2004, the latest data set 
would still be preferable.  Second, the underlying assumptions for the CGE model and the 
simulation scenarios should also be carefully examined (Resosudarmo, 1996).  Third, the 
CGE model utilised is a pseudo-dynamic model, not a true forward-looking CGE model 
in which all agents maximizing their objectives through some future infinite time horizon 
are modelled.  Hence, the dynamic simulation resulting from this model must be 
interpreted with caution.  Fourth, although households have been classified into ten 
different socio-economic classes, each household category still covers a range of incomes 
and socio-economic characteristics.  Consequently, some households in a particular class 
might be affected more than others in the same class.  Nevertheless, several important 
conclusions can be drawn from the results of the simulation described in this paper. 
 
First, observing several economic indicators, an implementation of the LEB 
policy is not beneficial for the country in the short term.  The LEB policy lowers the 
country’s GDP, causes negative gain of output (losses in the roundwood minus gains in 
the wood processing industries) as well as induces lower incomes for most household 
groups than if the LEB policy is not implemented.  The LEB policy would most likely be able to reduce the amount of logs harvested in the short-run, especially if this policy does 
not cause inefficient log utilisation behaviour in the wood processing industries. 
 
Second, in the long-run, the LEB policy might eventually be able to deliver 
benefits to the country, with the growing wood processing industries maybe 
compensating for the reduced roundwood activity under the no LEB policy.  However, 
these growing wood processing industries might require more logs to be cut compared to 
a situation in which they are not growing this fast. 
 
Third, imposing an appropriately high tax on exported logs seems preferable than 
the LEB policy.  This kind of tax policy does not fully wipe out potential gain from 
export, and hence induces higher GDP in the short-run as well as higher total present 
value of GDP gain in a long-run observation, compared to the condition under the LEB 
policy.  And in the long-run period, this policy would be able to lower the rate of log 
harvesting compared to the rate under the LEB policy. 
 
Fourth, allowing collusive practices when the LEB policy is implemented — 
people still being able to export their logs as long as they are willing to pay higher bribes 
— is not an appropriate option.  The export tax policy clearly dominates this policy in 
almost all indicators.  Besides, although not arising from the simulation in this paper, the 
Indonesian experience shows that allowing this kind of practice will only create political 
instability and unfair conditions. 
 
Finally, although the common expectation in implementing the LEB policy is to 
attract much higher investment in the wood processing sectors, simulation in this paper 
shows that excessively high investment might not be that beneficial for the country.  
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